Just six weeks after a tenuous peace plan between the government of Colombian President Juan Manuel Santos and the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) collapsed, the two sides have just inked a new, revived agreement to end the brutal conflict that has caused the deaths of at least 250,000 people.
And this time around, there is a good chance that the accord, which could bring to a close the 52-year war of vicious political murders, kidnappings, drug trafficking and other heinous criminal acts, might just pass a referendum and take hold.
The new agreement is geared to addressing the concerns of opponents of the original accord, who felt the deal was too lenient on a rebel group that has kidnapped civilians and committed war crimes against Colombia’s general population.
The original plan, which took four years to iron out and was aimed at letting bygones be bygones on both sides, offered a colossal olive branch to the FARC in the form of amnesty for all their crimes.
But Colombian voters rejected the 297-page agreement in a razor-thin vote of nay on Oct. 2, dealing a serious blow to Santos, who, despite the setback, was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize five days later for his efforts in fighting the good fight.
Unscathed and unwavering in his commitment to find a viable path to peace for his country, Santos immediately went about the business of trying to rescue the deal, convincing both sides to extend a cease-fire through Dec. 31.
Clearly, the wounds of five decades of war against the FARC were far too extensive and too fresh to be forgiven by many of its victims and their families, and more than a few Colombian civilians were more interested in retribution than reconciliation.
And, understandably, the rebels were none too eager to change the conditions of the first accord, which would have allowed 7,000 FARC paramilitary fighters to set down their arms and confess their crimes in exchange for what would have amounted to little more than a slap on the wrist.
The new modified accord specifies punishment for combatants accused of war crimes and reparations for the conflict’s victims.
To get the FARC to sign, Santos promised leniency as to how and where those responsible for crimes would serve their sentences, and he included clauses on “alternative punishments.”
It’s a compromise that might just bridge the gap that kept Plan I from getting passed.
Other modifications to the treaty include a clause requiring the FARC to present an inventory of acquired money and holdings, as well as a provision of safeguards for private owners and property during reforms carried out in the Colombian countryside.
But there are still some sticking points that could derail the new treaty.
The government and the FARC are still at loggerheads over one of the most sensitive issues for the South American nation’s general public: The right of former guerrilla leaders to run for elected office.
Many opponents of the new plan feel that the rebels, who were responsible for criminal acts, should be barred from any political activities.
They are, of course, wrong, because if the former guerrillas have no legitimate means of expression, they have much more incentive to resort to their traditional means of manifesting their views, i.e., violence.
Clearly, after 52 years of war, no treaty is going to satisfy everyone involved, but the only feasible way to reach a durable peace is through understanding and give-and-take.
At this point, it is up to the Colombian people, who, in the coming weeks, will once again cast their votes to determine whether to approve the revised treaty.
In the end, as I have said before, peace — at whatever cost — is the only way to bring an end to the vicious cycle of carnage that has scarred Colombia for more than half a century.
And, sooner or later, past grievances will have to give way to hope.
Thérèse Margolis can be reached at therse.margolis@gmail.com.